1. Introduction. The stochastic games we study have n players 1, 2, . . . , n. The state space S is a Borel subset of a Polish space. Each player i has a compact metric action set A i . The set ∆(A i ) of probability measures defined on the Borel subsets of A i is equipped with its usual weak topology and, hence, ∆(A i ) is also compact metrizable. Let A = A 1 × A 2 × · · · × A n have its product topology and it too is compact metrizable. The law of motion q is a conditional probability distribution on S given S × A with the interpretation that, if the players choose actions a = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) ∈ A at state s ∈ S, then q(·|s, a) is the conditional distribution of the next state. We always assume that q(B|s, a) is Borel measurable jointly in (s, a) for B a Borel subset of S, and we will make further assumptions below.
The game begins at some initial state s 1 . The players choose actions a 1 = (a 1 1 , a 2 1 , . . . , a n 1 ) and the next state s 2 has distribution q(·|s 1 , a 1 ). This process is iterated to generate a random history or play h = (s 1 , (a 1 , s 2 ), (a 2 , s 3 ), . . .) ∈ H = S × (A × S) N .
Here a k = (a 1 k , a 2 k , . . . , a n k ) is, for each k, the n-tuple of actions chosen by the players at stage k. Each player i has a bounded, Borel measurable payoff function f i : H → R and receives f i (h) as payoff at history h. Let f = (f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f n ) be the n-tuple of payoff functions.
Denote by H * the disjoint union of the sets S, S × (A × S), S × (A × S) 2 , . . .; that is,
The elements of H * are called partial histories.
A strategy σ i for player i assigns to each partial history p = (s 1 , (a 1 , s 2 ), . . . , (a k−1 , s k )) in H * the conditional distribution σ i (p) ∈ ∆(A i ) for a i k given p. Formally, a strategy for player i is a Borel function from H * into ∆(A i ). It is assumed that the players choose their actions independently. So the conditional distribution of a k given p is the product measure
on A.
An n-tuple σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . , σ n ) consisting of a strategy for each player is called a profile. A profile σ together with an initial state s 1 determines the distribution P σ = P s1,σ of the history h. Note that, by an abuse of notation, we write σ(p) for the n-tuple (σ 1 (p), σ 2 (p), . . . , σ n (p)) as well as for the product measure in (1) . The meaning will always be clear from the context.
The stochastic game Γ(f, s 1 ) begins at state s 1 . The players select strategies to form a profile σ and each player i receives the expected payoff
We write E σ f for the vector of expected payoffs (E σ f 1 , E σ f 2 , . . . , E σ f n ).
To define a subgame of Γ(f, s 1 ) let p = (s 1 , (a 1 , s 2 ), . . . , (a k−1 , s k )) be a partial history. The length of p, written lh(p), is defined to be k − 1. (Thus lh(s) = 0 for s ∈ S.) Denote by l(p) the last state s k of p. The subgame Γ(f, p) is the stochastic game with initial state s k = l(p) and payoff functions f i p defined for histories h = (s k , (b 1 , t 2 ), (b 2 , t 3 ), . . .)
Thus f i p is the section of f i at p. We use Γ(f, ·) to denote the collection of all the games Γ(f, p), p ∈ H * . (Notice that the game Γ(f, s) is itself the subgame Γ(f, p) for which p = s.)
For a strategy σ i and a partial history p, the conditional strategy given p is written
Now we can define a subgame perfect equilibrium (or SPE for short) for Γ(f, ·) as being a profile σ such that, for all p ∈ H * , the conditional profile σ[p] is a Nash equilibrium for the subgame Γ(f, p).
To prove the existence of an SPE, further conditions on the game are necessary. (Without additional assumptions there need not exist an SPE even for one-person games.) To state one of the conditions, let ∆(S) be the set of probability measures defined on the Borel subsets of the state space S.
Condition 1 Variation norm continuity. For every fixed s ∈ S, the law of motion q(·|s, a) is a continuous function of a when ∆(S) is given the topology induced by the total variation norm. This is a very strong condition and it would be preferable to assume some sort of weak continuity for the law of motion such as Condition 3 in Section 3 below. However, as is explained in the introduction of Mertens and Parthasarathy (2003) , it seems difficult to do without Condition 1.
A key assumption on the payoffs needed for our results is inspired by Dubins and Savage (1976) , who study (finitely additive) probability measures on an infinite product of spaces each of which is given the discrete topology. Definition 1.1 Suppose that each of the nonempty sets X 1 , X 2 , . . . has the discrete topology and the product Y = X 1 × X 2 × · · · has the product topology. Then a continuous function g defined on Y is called DS-continuous.
It follows from Definition 1.1 that a function g : Y → R is DS-continuous if and only if, for each x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . .) ∈ Y and > 0, there exists n such that |g(x) − g(x )| < for every x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . .) such that x i = x i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. If Y = X 1 × X 2 × · · · is a product of Borel sets some of which are uncountable, then continuity in the product of the Borel topologies is a more stringent requirement than DS-continuity. The function g is called finitary if it depends only on the coordinates x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x t for some stop rule t such that t(x) < ∞ for all x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . .). Finitary functions are clearly DS-continuous, and, in fact, the DS-continuous functions are precisely those functions that can be uniformly approximated by finitary functions. (A Borel measurable version of this fact is Lemma 3.1 below. See Dubins and Savage (1976) for a discussion of the properties of finitary functions.) Functions that depend on the the tail of the sequence x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . .), such as g(x) = lim sup m u m (x m ) for some functions u m : X m → R, are typically not DS-continuous. Now we can state our first theorem. Theorem 1.1 Assume that the payoff functions f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f n depend only on the sequence of states and are DS-continuous from H into R. Assume also that Condition 1 holds. Then Γ(f, ·) has a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Recall that we always assume that the payoff f is bounded and Borel measurable for the product of the original Polish topologies.
An example in Harris et al (1995) shows this theorem does not hold in general for payoff functions that depend on actions as well as states. However, the corresponding result is true when the action sets are finite. Our last result is for games with additive payoffs.
Condition 2 Additive rewards. Assume that, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, Antecedents. The papers of Nowak (1984) , and Rieder (1991) contain early results on stochastic games with continuous payoffs when the state space is countable. Sengupta (1975) treats zero-sum games with lower semicontinuous payoffs, finite action sets, and a compact metric state space. The arguments in this paper owe a great deal to the earlier work of Mertens and Parthasarathy (1991, 2003) and Solan (1998) . Indeed, the method we use in the next section is abstracted from Solan's proof that SPE's exist for discounted stochastic games. A crucial tool for us, as it was for Solan, is the "measurable "measurable" choice theorem" of Mertens (2003) . We also rely on concepts introduced in the gambling theory of Dubins and Savage (1976) . Theorem 1.3 is very close in spirit to the results of Mertens and Parthasarathy (2003) and Solan (1998) . Our proof of Theorem 1.3 is similar to that of Solan, but our result is different from his in that the additive payoff functions of Theorem 1.3 need not be discounted.
The existence of stationary equilibria for discounted stochastic games has been proved under various assumptions. See, for example, Nowak (2003b) , and Parthasarathy and Sinha (1989) . Of course, stationary equilibria are, in particular, subgame perfect.
Since subgame perfect equilibria do not always exist, it is natural to look for subgame perfect correlated equilibria. Their existence has been established in different contexts by Harris et al (1995) , Nowak and Raghavan (1992) , Nowak (2003a) , and Solan and Vieille (2002) among others.
Outline. In the next section we prove an abstract existence result to the effect that an SPE exists for Γ(f, ·) when the payoff f is DS-continuous and can be uniformly approximated by a sufficiently nice function g such that Γ(g, ·) has an SPE. Borel finitary functions are introduced in Section 3 and seen to provide an appropriate class of nice approximating functions for the proof of Theorem 1.1. Theorem 1.2 follows easily from Theorem 1.1 in Section 4. The abstract result of Section 2 is applied again in the last section to prove Theorem 1.3.
2. An adaptation of a proof of E. Solan E. Solan (1998) gave a nice proof of the existence of SPE's for discounted stochastic games. In this section we adapt his methods to prove a technical result which will be the key to our proofs of Theorems 1.1-1.3.
We make the following assumptions throughout this section.
n where R is a fixed positive real number.
Assumption 2.2 There exist Borel functions g m : H → [−R, R]
n , m ∈ N with the following properties:
n , ||φ|| = sup h |φ(h)| and | · | is the usual norm on Euclidean n-space.
(ii) for each m, there is a subgame perfect equilibrium σ m in the game Γ(g m , ·) with corresponding equilibrium payoff V m :
Furthermore, for each p ∈ H * , σ m (p) is an equilibrium profile in the one-move game with payoff V m (pat) q(dt|l(p), a) and equilibrium payoff
and the family of functions { V m (pat) q(dt|l(p), a) : m ∈ N} is equicontinuous in a.
Remark 2.1 Notation.
(i) For p ∈ H * , a ∈ A, and t ∈ S, the notation pat used above denotes the partial history that consists of the coordinates of p followed by a and t.
(ii) Recall that we use σ m (p) to denote the product measure σ
, and also for the n-tuple (σ
Here is the technical result we will need. Theorem 2.1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the game Γ(f, ·) has a subgame perfect equilibrium.
The proof will use certain properties of multifunctions which we present in four lemmas.
Let X be a Borel subset of a Polish space, let Y be a Polish space, and let {ψ m } be a sequence of Borel functions from X into Y . The multifunction Ls(ψ m ) from X to subsets of Y assigns to each x ∈ X the set Ls(ψ m )(x) of all y ∈ Y such that, for every open subset U of Y containing y, ψ m (x) ∈ U for infinitely many m. We write Gr(Ls(ψ m )) for the graph of Ls(ψ m ), namely the set
Lemma 2.1 Gr(Ls(ψ m )) is a Borel subset of X × Y , and, for each x, Ls(ψ m )(x) is a closed subset of Y .
Proof. Let {U m } be a countable base for the topology of Y . Then
which is clearly Borel. The proof that Ls(ψ m )(x) is closed is completely straightforward.
A multifunction F from X to Y is defined to be Borel measurable if, for every open subset U of Y , the set {x ∈ X : F (x) ∩ U = ∅} is a Borel subset of X. Proof. Part (a) follows from the previous lemma, the precompactness assumption, and the Kunugui -Novikov theorem. (See 4F.12 in Moschovakis (1980) or 4.7.11 in Srivastava (1998).) Part (b) is a consequence of (a) and the selection theorem of Kuratowski and Ryll-Nardzewski (1965) . (Or see Corollary 5.2.5 in Srivastava (1998) .)
The next lemma records, for ease of reference, a part of Lemma 3, page 69, in Hildenbrand (1974) .
n and let µ be a probability measure on the Borel subsets of Y . Suppose lim m ψ m dµ exists. Then there is a Borel selector ψ of Ls(ψ m ) such that ψ dµ = lim m ψ m dµ.
Our last lemma specializes a deep result of Mertens (2003) n as values. Let q(·|y) be a Borel measurable transition function from Y to Z. Define a multifunction G on Y as follows:
Then (i) G is a Borel measurable multifunction with nonempty compact values,
(ii) there is a Borel measurable function g :
n such that, for every (y, x) ∈ Gr(G), g(y, x, ·) is a selector for the multifunction F (y, ·) and
Remark 2.2 The multifunction G in Lemma 2.4 can also be described, for each y
To see this, fix a Borel selector φ of F and define
The proof of Theorem 2.1 now proceeds in a number of steps.
Step
n is compact. So, by Lemma 2.2, D is Borel measurable with nonempty compact values.
Step 2. Define u m :
By Assumption 2.2, u m is a Caratheodory function (Borel in p and continuous in a). Also the set {u m (p, ·) : m ≥ 1} is an equicontinuous subset of the space
n . Hence, by the Arzela-Ascoli theorem, this set is precompact in the topology of uniform convergence on C.
Step 3. Next define φ m :
Plainly, φ m is Borel measurable. Also note that, for each p ∈ H * , the set {σ m (p) : m ≥ 1} is precompact in the topology of weak convergence on ∆(A). Observe that a limit point of {σ m (p) : m ≥ 1} is again a product measure on A.
Step 4. Define another multifunction G on Gr(D) by
It is easy to see that Gr(G) is a Borel subset of x) is the x-section of the nonempty compact set Ls(φ m )(p), and so is itself compact. Hence, by Lemma 2.2, G is a Borel measurable multifunction on the Borel set Gr(D) with nonempty compact values, and there are Borel functions v * and ν
(We remind the reader that, as mentionned at the end of step 3, ν * (p, x) is a product measure on A.)
Step 5. We define a third multifunction Ω on H * × A by
By Lemma 2.4 and Remark 2.2, Ω is a Borel measurable multifunction with nonempty compact values (so that Gr(Ω) is a Borel subset of H * × A × [−R, R] n ) and there exists a Borel function ψ :
, for all t ∈ S, and (ii) ψ(p, a, x, t) q(dt|l(p), a) = x, for every (p, a, x) ∈ Gr(Ω).
Step 6. Claim:
The last statement can be written as
So, by Lemma 2.3, there is a Borel function g :
It follows from (5) and (6) that v * (p, x)(a) ∈ Ω(p, a).
where ψ is the function introduced in Step 5. Then ψ * is well-defined by Step 6. Plainly, ψ * is a Borel function. Note that it follows from (ii) of Step 5 that
for every (p, a, x, t) ∈D.
Step 8. Claim: For (p, x) ∈ Gr(D), ν * (p, x) is an equilibrium profile in the one-move game with payoff v * (p, x)(a) and the corresponding equilibrium payoff is x.
To see this, choose a subsequence
Since σ mi (p) is an equilibrium profile in the one-move game with payoff u mi (p, ·) by Assumption 2.2(ii) and V mi (p) is the corresponding equilibrium payoff by virtue of (4), the claim follows from (8).
Step 9. We are now in a position to define a profile τ for the game Γ(f, ·). (It will turn out that τ is an SPE.) First define a function π :
n by recursion as follows: for s ∈ S, set π(s) = ξ(s) where ξ is a fixed, but arbitrary, Borel selector for D(s); and, for p ∈ H * , a ∈ A, and t ∈ S, let π(pat) = ψ * (p, a, π(p), t).
Using step 5 and induction on the length of p, one proves easily that π(p) ∈ D(p) and that π is welldefined. Clearly, π is a Borel function. The profile τ can now be defined on H * by
So τ is also clearly Borel.
We prove the claim for p = s ∈ S. (The proof for other p's is similar and is omitted.) Let > 0 and fix h = (s 1 , (a 1 , s 2 ), (a 2 , s 3 ), . . .) ∈ H. By the DS-continuity of f (Assumption 2.1), we can choose k so large that with (s 1 , (a 1 , s 2 ) , . . . , (a k−1 , s k )), we have ||f (ph ) − f (h)|| < /2 for all h ∈ (A × S) N . (Here ph is the history that consists of the coordinates of p followed by those of h .) Next choose M so large that ||g m − f || < /2 for all m ≥ M . So, if q ⊇ p, m ≥ M , and x ∈ D(q), then ||x − f (h)|| ≤ . To see this, observe that
Hence, by step 9, ||π(p l (h)) − f (h)|| ≤ , and therefore
Denote the history generated by the probability measure P τ with initial state s by
where the last two equalities are by (7) and step 8, respectively.
But, by the martingale property,
s) for all m ≥ 1. Hence π(s) = V (s) and the proof of the claim is complete for p = s.
Step 11. The last step in the proof of Theorem 2.1 is to show that τ is an SPE for Γ(f, ·). Let τ = (τ 1 , τ 2 , . . . , τ n ) and fix a strategy σ for player i.
i of V (p) as defined in step 10.
Again we denote the history generated by Pτ with initial state s by (s, Y 1 , Y 2 , . . . , Y m , . . .).
Claim: The process
. . is a supermartingale under Pτ .
To verify this, let λ(p) be the product measure
for p ∈ H * . Then calculate:
Here the inequality is by virtue of the fact that τ (p) = ν * (p, π(p)) is an equilibrium profile in the one-move game with payoff ψ
it follows from the supermartingale property that
This proves that τ is an equilibrium profile in the game Γ(f, s). The proof that, for p ∈ H * , τ [p] is an equilibrium profile in the game Γ(f, p) is similar and is omitted.
The proof of Theorem 2.1 is now complete.
3. Finitary games and the proof of Theorem 1.1 In order to deduce Theorem 1.1 from Theorem 2.1, we first identify the class of functions that will be used to approximate the payoff f as in Assumption 2.2.
Let t be a Borel function from S N to {0, 1, . . .} ∪ {∞}. We say that t is a Borel, stopping time if, given elements x = (s 1 , s 2 , . . .) and y = (r 1 , r 2 , . . .) in S N such that t(x) < ∞ and y agrees with x in the first t(x) coordinates, then t(x) = t(y). If, in addition, t(x) < ∞ for all x ∈ S N , then t is called a stop rule. A Borel function g : S N → R is a Borel, finitary function if there exists a Borel stop rule t such that g(x) = g(y) whenever y agrees with x in the first t(x) coordinates. In this case, the function g is said to be determined by time t.
Borel finitary functions will play the role of the functions g m in Assumption 2.2. First we establish that they can be used to uniformly approximate the payoff functions of Theorem 1.1. As in the previous section, R denotes a fixed positive real number. 
It is now easy to check that
Then ψ is obviously Borel. It is determined by time t and is therefore finitary. By construction, |φ(x) − ψ(x)| ≤ for all x.
We need a bit of notation. Define Φ :
Recall that
Suppose that f = (f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f n ) is the Borel, DS-continuous payoff function of Theorem 1.1. Since the f i are bounded, we can assume that f : H → [−R, R] n . Also, since f depends only on the sequence of states, we can findf :
By Lemma 3.1, there is, for each > 0, a Borel, finitary functionḡ :
n such that ||ḡ −f || < . Define g on H by g(h) = (ḡ • Φ)(h). Then g approximates f on H uniformly within . Most of the remainder of this section is devoted to the study of the game Γ(g, ·), which we call a finitary game. At the end of the section we will deduce Theorem 1.1 from Theorem 2.2 and the properties of finitary games.
For our treatment of finitary games, we will not need the full strength of Condition 1 and we will replace it by the weaker condition below. (ii) for each p ∈ H * , the one-move game with payoff V (pat) q(dt|l(p), a) has equilibrium profile σ(p) with corresponding equilibrium payoff V (p).
Proof. Let t be a Borel stop rule on S N such thatḡ is determined by time t. The stop rule t defines a tree on S as follows:
Thus T is both analytic and coanalytic. Hence, by Suslin's Theorem (Moschovakis, 1980, 2E.2), T is Borel.
Furthermore, T is a Borel tree on S, which means (i) T is a Borel subset of S * , and
(ii) T is closed under initial segments; that is, (
Observe that, since t is everywhere finite, T is a Borel well-founded relation (i.e. T has no infinite branches). It now follows, courtesy of a result of Moschovakis (1980, section 4C.14) , that there is a coanalytic, non-Borel subset C of a Polish space Z, a function η on C onto ω 1 , the first uncountable ordinal, and a Borel function ξ on T into C such that (a) η is a coanalytic norm on C, and ((s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s l ))) < η(ξ ((s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s m )) ).
For the definition of a coanalytic norm, see Moschovakis (1980, pages 200-201 ). We will use only the following two properties of coanalytic norms: (c) For every ordinal α < ω 1 , the set {z ∈ C : η(z) = α} is a Borel subset of Z (Moschovakis (1980, 4C.7)),
Define a function i : T → ω 1 by i ((s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s m )) = η(ξ ((s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s m ))). For every α < ω 1 , let
Then each T α is a Borel subset of S * by virtue of (c). Also, since ξ(T ) is an analytic subset of C, it follows from (d) that there isᾱ < ω 1 such that T = ∪ α≤ᾱ T α .
The following lemma will be needed. In the lemma and the sequel, we use the notation B(X) to denote the Borel σ-field of a topological space X. n such that ρ(y, s) is an equilibrium profile in the game G(y, s) and W (y, s) is the corresponding equilibrium payoff, i.e. W (y, s) = ζ(y, t) q(dt|s, a)ρ(y, s)(da).
Proof. Let F (y, s) be the set of all equilibrium profiles (µ 1 , µ 2 , . . . , µ n ) for the game G(y, s). It is easy to verify that F (y, s) is a nonempty compact subset of the set of all profiles Now let C be the smallest σ-field on H * which makes Ψ measurable, i.e., C = Ψ −1 (B(S)). Fix
. . , n, s * ∈ S, and let x * = (s * , s * , . . .) be that point in S * all of whose coordinates are s * . Now, for p ∈ Ψ −1 (S * − T ), the function x →ḡ(Ψ(p)x) is constant for x ∈ S * . So we define
Then (e) V and σ are defined on the set Ψ −1 (S * − T ) ∈ C and are measurable with respect to the restriction of
is an equilibrium profile in the one-move game with payoff V (pat) q(dt|l(p), a), and
We will now extend the definitions of the functions V and σ to all of H * so that they are C-measurable and properties (f) and (g) continue to hold. Since Ψ −1 (T ) = ∪ α≤ᾱ Ψ −1 (T α ), the definitions of V and σ will proceed by transfinite induction.
So suppose that α ≤ᾱ and V, σ have been defined for all p ∈ ∪ β<α Ψ −1 (T β ) so that (f) and (g) still hold and also that (h) V and σ are measurable with respect to the restriction of C to (
We will now define V and σ on the C-set
, so that V (pat) and σ(pat) are defined for all a ∈ A, t ∈ S. We next apply Lemma 3.2 with
, where a * is a fixed element of A, and the σ-field D equal to the restriction of C to Ψ −1 (T α ). Let ρ and W be the functions whose existence is asserted in Lemma 3.2. We now define, for p ∈ Ψ −1 (T α ),
It is straightforward to check that σ and V satisfy (f)-(h). Sinceᾱ is countable, this completes the extension of σ and V to H * so that (f)-(h) are satisfied.
It remains to be verified that, for all p ∈ H * , the conditional profile σ[p] is an equilibrium in the game Γ(g, p) and that V (p) = E σ[p] (gp) is the corresponding equilibrium payoff. This is trivially true for p ∈ Ψ −1 (S * − T ) since the function gp is constant for such p. For p ∈ Ψ −1 (T ), we will prove the assertion by another transfinite induction. So suppose the assertion is true for all p ∈ ∪ β<α Ψ −1 (T β ) and
. Let player i deviate by using τ [p] at p and letσ = (σ −i , τ ) be the resulting profile. Recall that g i , the ith coordinate of g, is the payoff function for player i. Recall also that g i p is the section of g i by the partial history p as in (2) . Now calculate as follows:
Here the second and fourth equalities and the second inequality are by virtue of the inductive hypothesis, while the first inequality holds because of (f). Finally,
where the second equality is by virtue of the inductive hypothesis and the third is by (g).
We are now ready to complete the proof of Theorem 1. (ii) for each p ∈ H * , the one-move game with payoff V m (pat) qdt|l(p), a) has equilibrium profile σ m (p) with corresponding equilibrium payoff V m (p).
Finally, it follows from Condition 1 and Lemma 3.6 in Solan (1998) that, for each p ∈ H * , the family We use the "partial history trick" to deduce Theorem 1.2 from Theorem 1.1. We take H * to be our state space andq to be our law of motion, wherē q(pat|p, a) = q(t|l(p), a).
We will definef on the new history spaceH = H * × (A × H * ) N as follows: Leth = (p 1 , (b 1 , p 2 ), (b 2 , p 3 ) . . .) ∈H. If there exists an h = (s 1 , (a 1 , s 2 ), (a 2 , s 3 ) , . . .) ∈ H such that (a 1 , s 2 
for all k = 1, 2, . . ., we setf (h) = f (h). If there is no such h ∈ H, let m = m(h) be the largest integer, possibly zero, such that (10) holds for all k = 1, 2, . . . , m for some h = (s 1 , (a 1 , s 2 ), (a 2 , s 3 ) , . . .) and let (a 1 , s 2 ) where a * and s * are fixed elements of A and S, respectively. (Note that m(h) could also be described as the largest m such that, for all k = 1, 2, . . . , m, lh(p k ) = k − 1 and p k extends p k−1 .) Thenf is bounded, Borel, DS-continuous, and depends only on states.
Since A is finite,q satisfies Condition 1. Hence, by Theorem 1.1, Γ(f , ·) has a subgame perfect equilibrium. It is now immediate that Γ(f, ·) has a subgame perfect equilibrium.
5. Additive payoffs and the proof of Theorem 1.3 In this section we assume both Condition 1 and Condition 2 of the Introduction. We write r k for the profile (r (a 1 , s 2 ) , . . . , (a l−1 , s l )) ∈ H * and fix ν i ∈ ∆(A i ), i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Then V m and σ m are Borel functions on H * . It is easy to check that, for each p ∈ H * , σ m (p) is an equilibrium profile in the one-move game with payoff V m (pat) q(dt|l(p), a) and that V m (p) is the corresponding equilibrium payoff. This is obvious if l > m. 
Finally, by repeating the argument in the last paragraph of the proof of Theorem 3.1, it is not hard to see that σ m is a subgame perfect equilibrium in the game Γ(g m , ·) with corresponding equilibrium payoff V m . (The argument is essentially a standard backward induction as in Rieder (1991) 
